Dr. Anthony T. Bryan is Senior Associate in the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. and Professor Emeritus at the University of Miami. He is a former Director of the Institute of International Relations and is currently involved in a research project on security in the Caribbean, funded by the Mc Arthur Foundation

In a recent address to the Conference on “The Principles of Fairness” held at the University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad, the Pro Vice-Chancellor and Campus Principal, Dr. Bhoe Tewarie remarked on what he saw as the seeming collapse of Trinidad and Tobago’s state institutions such as the police and judiciary, the apparent paralysis in governance, and the virtual breakdown of law and order. Tewarie described Trinidad and Tobago as a “failing” state but not a “failed” state. In my reading of the actual text of his address, it appears that he was quite correct in drawing the attention of his audience to a phenomenon that is gaining momentum worldwide, and that is drawing the attention of policy makers in the developed countries.

Naturally, there is still uncertainty about the definition and scope of the problem. During the Cold War years state “failure” was seen through the prism of superpower conflict and was not addressed as a danger in its own right. Today a sea change has occurred, and concern about weak, failing and failed states has moved from the periphery to the center of global politics. Some of the dangerous exports of such states – for example international terrorists, drug barons, and the trade in arms – are on the foreign policy agenda of almost every nation.

Two very recent publications have tried to seek definitions and attributes to explain the phenomenon. Robert I. Rotberg, president of the World Peace Foundation and director of Harvard University’s Failed States Project is the contributing editor of the book State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (2003). In addition, the current issue (July - August 2005) of the noted quarterly journal Foreign Policy, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C., has initiated an annual Failed States Index. Both of these publications have brought analysts a little closer to proper diagnoses of the phenomenon, by distinguishing contemporary cases of nation-state collapse and failure from generic weakness or ongoing distress. The Rotberg book further analyses the nature of state weakness and advances reasons why some states succumb to failure, or collapse, and why others remain weak without ever destructing.

How do you know a “failing” or “failed” state when you see one? This column is not the place for a detailed review of the arguments; but some conclusions offered in the publications cited above are important. The Rotberg book approaches the topic by defining the criteria for strong states and then by deduction looking at the characteristics of weak, failing, failed and collapsed states.

Two major characteristics of strong states provide a critical bench mark.

• States are strong when their governments are able to deliver public goods in an appropriate manner as expected by its citizens. These public goods include among other items, medical and health care (at varying levels and costs); schools and educational instruction (of various kinds and levels); public transportation and constant improvements in communications infrastructure, and so on.



• Strong states are also able to deliver a hierarchy of political goods of which none is more critical than the supply of security, especially human security. As Rotberg puts it: “the state’s prime function is to provide that political good of security—to prevent cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to eliminate domestic threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure; to prevent crime and related dangers to domestic human security; and to enable citizens to resolve their disputes with the state and with their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion.”

• The state that loses control of its jurisdiction and territory, or loses its monopoly on the legitimate use of force, has already earned the label of failed state. But weak states also show a mixed profile fulfilling expectations in some areas and performing poorly in others. The more poorly weak states perform, criterion by criterion, the more fragile they become. According to the book’s authors, the more the weakness tends to edge toward failure the state can then be characterized as failing.



• There are also more subtle, but very serious indicators of failure. The book singles out the growth of criminal violence that takes over the streets of cities, widespread lawlessness, and the paralysis of ordinary police forces, as the most serious indicators of a failing state! More importantly, they point to an irony in failing and failed states, namely, that they offer “unparalleled economic opportunity — but only for a privileged few.” Moreover, such states are often witness to the “flourishing of corruption on an unusually destructive scale.” These subtle indicators can move in tandem with other more visible indicators such as the deterioration in health services and in public transport.

Some weak states can collapse suddenly; but more often the demise of the state is a slow and steady deterioration of social and political institutions. (Zimbabwe and Guinea are seen as contemporary examples.) The Foreign Policy journal used 12 social, economic, political and military indicators, and ranked 60 states in order of their vulnerability to violent internal conflict. The 10 countries most at risk are Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Iraq, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Yemen, Liberia and Haiti. Many of the weak states are in Africa but signs of weakness are appearing in countries in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America (Colombia) and the MiddleEast.

Among the 12 indicators used in the Index, two consistently rank near the top: (1) Uneven development (inequality — not just poverty within states) and (2) criminalization or delegitimization of the state (which occurs when state institutions are regarded as corrupt, illegal or ineffective.) A complete discussion of the 12 indicators is available at www.ForeignPolicy.com and www.fundforpeace.org.

One of the more surprising conclusions reached by the Index is that many countries with oil and gas are quite vulnerable to state failure! (Iraq, Chad and Venezuela are seen at risk.) Political scientists have coined the term “petrostate” to describe a country “that is dependent on income from oil and gas yet plagued by weak institutions, a poorly functioning public sector, and a gross disparity of power and wealth. Most of the petrostates and energy rich states, while vulnerable, have also managed to craft and preserve a semblance of stability (Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Bahrain and Nigeria, among others). But the possession of large oil and gas reserves is no guarantee of stable government. Indeed some experts have argued that economies based on oil and energy “often stunt the development of stable, transparent institutions — a phenomenon that has been labeled the ‘resource curse’.”

Some “petrostates” may have learned lessons from the profligate and frivolous spending without a social conscience that accompanied the oil “boom” of the 1970s. But the economic tailspins that followed the boom in Venezuela, Nigeria, and Trinidad and Tobago are still painful memories. There is a risk that those mistakes may be repeated the second time around. Not preserving or accumulating wealth from today’s resources for future generations is a partial recipe for the eventual future failure of today’s “petrostates.”

Today, as the Index reveals, Haiti is the Caribbean country that is most at risk for becoming a failed state. Identifying the signs of state failure or the characteristics of a “failing” state is easier than crafting solutions. Pointing out where state failure is likely to occur is a mandatory first step. Preventing nation-states from failing, and resuscitating those that have failed, or have the potential to fail, is one of the most critical, strategic and moral imperatives of our time. Political and business leaders in any country would be well advised to look for the indicators, listen to the message, and not shoot the messengers!